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In his text, The Ethics of Evangelism: A Philosophical Defense ofProselytizing and Persuasion, Elmer John Thiessen aims to provide
a defense of religious proselytizing. This defense is based on his cen-
tral claim that proselytizing, which he defines as the “intentional,
direct, and overt communication that results in someone’s conversion” in a manner
that involves “a change of a person’s belief, behavior, identity, and belonging” (2011,
pp. 10–11), can in fact be ethically sound. The author maintains that this is the case de-
spite widely held aversion by the public to most forms of religious persuasion, as well
as other (i.e., liberal) arguments against evangelism.
In defending his central thesis, Thiessen begins by distinguishing between prose-
lytizing based on emotional, social, or psychological coercion, inducements, arrogance,
and other such manipulative tactics from religious persuasion that is respectfully tol-
erant, mindful of the dignity of all parties, and upholds an ethic of care. This ethic,
Thiessen contends, expresses “a genuine concern for the person” such that “the person
is not simply being used as a means to an end” (2011, p. 165). Thiessen also, in line
with this ethic, defends his assertion that most of the opposition to religious evangel-
ism fails to consider the benefits it has for both proselytizer and proselytizee.
Overall, I found Thiessen’s book to be well written and insightful. I also appreciated
the fact that the author took pains to be both balanced and fair with respect to the his-
torical excesses of proselytizing and the possibility of its more ethical deployment. He
makes it clear throughout this text that religious persuasion based upon coercion, ma-
nipulation, inducements, and other forms of exploitation are not acceptable. In doing
so, he also takes up and deals with issues of etiquette, as well as the arguments that
comprise liberal opposition to proselytizing in a perceptive and comprehensive way.
There are, however, a number of areas of Thiessen’s text that I found to be prob-
lematic. To begin with, I found that Thiessen underplays the colonial excesses of reli-
gious persuasion and defends religious conversion in rather problematic ways. For
example, his tendency to emphasize Christian opposition to slavery and its defense of
native rights (instead of its complicity in perpetuating the former and undermining
the latter), while somewhat accurate, tends towards being both overly simplistic and
Eurocentric. This supposition both facilitates the undervaluing of non-European soci-
eties and persists in framing non-Western peoples as barbaric and in need of civilizing.
It also, as such, undermines Thiessen’s conclusion that “[t]here is nothing wrong with
this dimension of missionary imperialism, if indeed it is even appropriate to use the
label “imperialism” here” (2011, p. 101).
There are also a number of instances in which the author uses insights from promi-
nent social theorists and philosophers to support his thesis in ways that are selective.
In fact, in a few instances, it becomes evident that the work of these thinkers refutes
Thiessen’s central claims. For example, in his section on truth, the author draws on
Jürgen Habermas’ basic pragmatic framework of communication and cites his asser-
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tion that all human communication employs the four validity claims of understand-
ability, truthfulness, sincerity, and appropriateness. This basic framework is used to re-
inforce Thiessen’s claim that because truthfulness is a definitionally open and elastic
concept, and because proselytizing demands that some truths be concealed—since
no one can ever be entirely truthful—it is therefore acceptable for religious proselytizers
to conceal some truths.
This example of the author’s selective use of Habermas is a case in point of a dis-
crepancy that is replicated with Thiessen’s use of Martha Nussbaum and Martin Buber.
In fact, a more accurate use of Habermas’ insights on truth and religion would most
likely refute Thiessen’s central thesis. Habermas, in such texts as Religion and
Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity, is clear that while religious traditions
have contributed to Enlightenment thought, there is an obvious distinction between
scientific knowledge and religious truths and, as such, no religious or theological claims
can be redeemed through argumentation in communicative action. This argument
also directly refutes the author’s assertion that one cannot divorce faith from other as-
pects of one’s life and that religious proselytizing in the public square is acceptable
(see p. 138). A short discussion of Habermas’ position, as such, might prevent readers
from assuming his work on communication supports Thiessen’s central arguments.
Thiessen also, in a number of cases, appears to confuse arguments of form with
those of content. For example, early in the book he conflates the accepted use of emo-
tional manipulation by charities, which often use images of starving children to solicit
donations, to the work of religious proselytizers who might use emotion in a similar
way. It is unclear, however, how closely related emotional persuasion aimed at religious
conversion, which requires that one make a personal and existential conversion in
line with religious doctrine, is to charitable appeals, which require one to simply donate
money.
In another example, Thiessen compares the ethical criteria of communication in
the realm of advertising and public relations to that of proselytizing in a manner that
elides their fundamental differences. With respect to truth, Thiessen asserts that since
“all advertising, indeed all communication, is selective in truth-telling … we cannot
demand of each instance of proselytizing that the entire truth be told about the faith
being advocated” (2011, p. 192). However, religion and advertising are dissimilar modes
of communication that differ in the most significant way possible, namely, what they
are “selling.” On the one hand, religion aims to promote a particular moral, ethical,
and sometimes political, way of life based on explicit conceptions of truth, justice,
morality, and community. The advertising of products, on the other hand, fails to meet
this set of criteria, except perhaps on the most superficial level possible, and therefore
provides little to warrant the comparison.
Yet, to be fair, further in the book Thiessen cautions against making a strong com-
parison between marketing, advertising, and religious communication since the for-
mer, because of its connection to commercialism, capitalism, and success, often “fails
in upholding the dignity and worth of persons” (2011, p. 207). However, he goes on to
argue that in light of this tendency towards crass commercialism, advertising and mar-
keting, like religious proselytizing, needs to operate in line with certain moral con-
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straints, such that it is made ethically acceptable. Yet, again, I question whether this is
a fruitful comparison in light of the intrinsic differences between the sale of commodi-
ties and that of religion.
Thiessen also makes what I see as a troubling parallel between work being done
on the sociology of science and technology (STS), which insists on the fallibility of sci-
entific truths, and the lack of so-called “proof” of religious truths, which he claims
should, as a result, be seen as laying on similar foundations. This, I argue, is not an ac-
curate, nor indeed a fair, comparison. There are, in science, both better and worse the-
ories, and although epistemic perfection can never be reached, sociologists working
in this area do not advocate for scientific relativism. Rather, most proponents of the
STS perspective call for increased reflexivity and a discussion of relations of power, pol-
itics, risk, and social impacts with respect to science. As such, the connection made by
Thiessen between fallible science and religious belief, I argue, does not hold.
I further question whether, because religious persuasion aims to fundamentally
alter beliefs about the most central and profound question of life and reality, it is pos-
sible for concerted exterior efforts to make such changes to ever be considered ethical
in the way Thiessen describes. Religious belief, for a number of historical, philosophical,
and political reasons, is an intrinsically personal thing and it remains the case that re-
ligious proselytizing has a propensity to impinge on and offend that very personal sen-
sibility, no matter how ethically it is approached.
Overall, while I found that Thiessen’s text had much to offer by way of a novel
perspective on proselytizing based on ethical principles, as I have discussed in the pre-
ceding review, I also found several thematic and structural inconsistencies that require
further attention.
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